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CONTAINING

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Book Reviews

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● THE FABIAN SOCIETY AND THE COLONIES

by RITA HINDEN

We received recently in the *Fabian Colonial Bureau* a letter of vehement reproach. Here is a short extract from it :—

> " I resigned my membership of the Bureau last year, after I had found that the Bureau merely seemed to be acting as a sort of Public Relations Officer for the Labour Government's Colonial Ministers, whose policies are indistinguishable from those of the Conservatives. I cannot conscientiously support people who do not try to live up to principles they have maintained so long in opposition. I am sorry to have lived to see the day when you have sought to justify and explain away these departures from things so strongly maintained in opposition."

Have we, in fact, " betrayed our principles " ? No honest person can remain quiescent under such an accusation. We feel challenged to turn back, for a moment, to the past, to compare our attitude then and now, to look once again at what has been happening in the colonial sphere since Labour took office, and to re-examine our own reactions to the new policies. Is there anything in these reactions to suggest a betrayal ?

The Fabian Society began coherent work on the Colonies when it founded the Colonial Bureau in 1940. It was obvious at that time that the Colonies were in a state of miserable neglect. The nineteen thirties were an unhappy epoch, in all spheres of our national life. Our political ideas seemed to be confined to ' security first ' or appeasement, and our economic purposes were chained to profit-making. The Colonies were not, on the whole, an attractive proposition for profit-makers. It was a period of so-called ' over-production ', particularly of primary products, which happened to be the main output of the Colonies; so that the incentive to invest in and develop these countries was minimal, even if anyone had been prepared to provide the necessary capital. During the depression of the nineteen thirties, things went from bad to worse. Everywhere in the Colonies discontent was simmering, boiling over sporadically into strikes, disturbances, riots, even bloodshed. Consciences in Britain had begun to stir—particularly when Hitler and Mussolini put forward *their* claims to a share in colonial possessions. In the late thirties a phenomenal number of investigations were set on foot, Commissions of Enquiry were appointed, and Reports issued, and 1940 saw the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act—an unprecedented measure at that time, even though it involved the expenditure of only £5,000,000 a year on all Colonies.

● *The author of this article, Dr. Rita Hinden, has been Secretary of the Fabian Colonial Bureau since its inception in 1940. She is the author of ' A Plan for Africa ' and various pamphlets, and editor of ' Fabian Colonial Essays ' and ' Co-operation in the Colonies '.*

The intolerably bad conditions—economic, political, social—which the merest scratching of the surface of Colonial Reports immediately revealed, suggested obvious lines of work for the Fabian Colonial Bureau. There was at the time so little other organised interest being shown in colonial affairs, that everything the Bureau did had an air of rather exciting novelty. It needed no great intelligence to reveal the most flagrant evils. The finger could so easily be put on such abuses as the absence of proper labour legislation, the victimisation of workers who tried to organise, the negligible number of Trade Unions which had struggled into existence. The many disgraceful examples of race discrimination—in salaries paid to civil servants, in ownership of land in some Colonies, in political representation—could be pointed to. Or one could expose economic exploitation in all its forms—the mining of valuable minerals by private European companies, who exported all the profits overseas; the payment of royalties on minerals to defunct British companies doing nothing to deserve them; the purchase of export crops at excessively low prices, with the trading profit going to middlemen and European marketing firms. One could protest against the failure to develop a sustained effort for building up co-operative organisations among the colonial peoples which would protect their own interests. And perhaps most important, the stagnation in political progress cried out for denunciation. The constitutional advances for which colonial people were ready and anxious—the extension of the suffrage, democratic representation on the Legislative Councils, or the beginnings of responsibility in government—all seemed to be caught up in a bog of official inertia.

It was as clear as daylight, in such a situation, that a broadside needed to be launched against the apathy of Colonial administration, against the whole system which allowed such apathy to continue. Public opinion had to be made conscious of what was being done—or, as often as not, *not* being done—in its name, and there was a positive duty for anyone interested in these problems to try to formulate what might be a constructive approach. This was the task into which the Bureau plunged in the first years of its work. It was an inspiring task, and a grateful one. There was a sufficient public opinion ready to be roused—a generosity of spirit, particularly in the Labour Movement, which responded eagerly to the demands that these things should no longer be. The Bureau did its best to avoid the error of ' bombinating in a vacuum '. It tried to gather its facts accurately, to be balanced in its judgment, and to put forward practical suggestions in the Fabian tradition, and it was immensely encouraged by the support it received on all sides—not only from this country, but from the Colonies.

Possibly, if the Labour Party had not topped the polls in 1945, and the whole economic position of Britain, and, consequently, her attitude to the Colonies had not changed, we could still have pursued our task in the old way, gaining ever-widening circles of support. But it so happened that Britain emerged from the war shorn of her external investments, in parlous economic straits, and desperately short of many of the products which the Colonies could produce. This in itself would have been sufficient to revolutionise the approach to colonial develop-

ment; the old *laisser-faire* ideas, both at home and in the empire, had to go, no matter what Party was in power. But it so happened, too, that the Labour Government came into office, so that the stage was fairly set for carrying out all those development programmes—coupled with political liberties—for which we have always stood. It was immediately self-evident that the Bureau would have to enter into a new phase of its work; it would have to talk a new language, because the whole of the circumstances had altered—and perhaps, in talking this new language, alienate the more rigid-minded of its old supporters.

The leading people who had been most closely associated with our work found themselves with the reins of power in their hands. Here came that inevitable challenge which all parties and all statesmen must face when they move from opposition into office. Can they put an end to the evils which they have themselves denounced for so long? Is it humanly possible? And if they are found to be compromising, is their compromise inevitable, or is it due to lack of principle? The Government itself faces this challenge; their supporters face a challenge of a different type. Will *they* demand the impossible, lose faith in their ertswhile leaders, cling to the opposition attitude, and crab everything that is done, unless it can immediately go one hundred per cent of the way? The distinction between 'loyalty' and 'sycophancy', between 'constructive' and 'destructive' criticism, must be drawn with a fine line. It is an immensely difficult moment, both for the leaders and for their followers when any Party is translated from opposition to responsibility.

The Bureau recognised this, and was prepared to combine criticism with loyalty. It was aware, in its criticisms, of the very important distinction that had to be made between the policy of the Government, and actual performance in the field. This is always a knotty problem; in colonial affairs, it had complications of its own. Colonial administration is, at best, an unsatisfactory thing. There is little direct public opinion brought to bear on the Colonial Office as compared with other Government Departments affecting daily life in Britain, and the Colonies themselves are still largely under bureaucratic control. Even if excellent work is done in the Colonial Office, in spite of the negligible public interest, the administrators in London are hundreds or thousands of miles distant from the men on the spot. These men do not change with every government; the casting of votes in a general election in Britain does not automatically change their habits of mind; and it is impossible to remove them except by a slow and gradual process. There are a host of ways in which they can quite conscientiously, and without the slightest malice, sabotage the good intentions of Whitehall. And as more political power is given to Colonial Legislatures, yet a further complication enters. These Legislatures might have very different ideas from a Socialist Government at home—it may even be that the popularly elected members on them are those most at variance. The Colonial Office cannot at the same time concede political power to the local people, and also impose its own ideas and its own will. The results are obvious. London produces plans, despatches, excellent statements of policy, far-reaching proposals; on the spot nothing—or very little—happens. The proposals have to be translated into laws applicable to each separate Colony.

Unenthusiastic officials delay, or find quite legitimate excuses why these ideas will not work in their own territory. Who, in London, is to know of these delays in dozens of scattered Colonies? And even if the new laws take shape and come before the Colonial Legislature, local interests may oppose them; local public opinion may not be ready, and sinister interpretations may be attributed.

In its policy from the centre, the Labour Government has a magnificent record—and to that we have been very ready to pay continuous tribute. But onlookers, who may not have followed all the White Papers and Despatches which have emerged from the Colonial Office, and base their judgments on reports from people in the Colonies, saying that in fact there is little change as yet, are often quick to conclude—as our correspondent quoted above—that this Government's "policies are indistinguishable from those of the Conservatives". They are judging the *performance* in the field, and not the *policy* which is being slowly evolved at the centre. They cannot understand when people, like ourselves, have a good word to say for this policy; it is beyond their comprehension how, things being as bad as they are on the spot, we can be so conscienceless as not to continue condemning everyone and everything, lock, stock and barrel. And from this, it is an easy enough stage to accusing us of betrayal.

Not only must a distinction be made between policy (which we believe has been good) and performance (which we are less happy about); there is need too, as one moves from opposition to responsibility, to distinguish sharply between *principles* and *programmes*. We built our work on certain principles of the fundamental equality of rights of all human beings, irrespective of race; and to realise such principles we elaborated a political programme, which contained points such as constitutional reforms, trade union recognition, no colour discrimination, nationalisation of minerals, economic development, international accountability. The greater part of this programme has, in fact, now become Government policy. We challenge any honest enquirer to go through our past writings and proposals, compare them with the programme of the Labour Government in two and a half years of office, and then deny the accuracy of this statement! There has been a quite phenomenal obedience in the shaping of colonial policy to the ideas for which we campaigned in opposition.

Nevertheless, we know there are points in the programme which are being carried through only half-heartedly, if at all. The Labour Government has not yet abolished race discrimination in the ownership of land in Kenya, for example; it has not given such enthusiastic support for United Nations supervision of colonial administration as one might have expected from its earlier programme announcements; it has not given self-determination to the people of Cyprus by allowing them to unite with Greece. But events—sometimes completely unexpected—may make detailed points in a programme unworkable. It is unrealistic not to recognise this; and there is nothing sacrosanct about any programme as such. What *is* sacrosanct are the principles. When we are accused of betraying *principles*, our critics really mean that we are justifying *deviations from the programme*. We can think of no case at all (with the possible exception of land in Kenya, and even then the argument

is complicated) where—taking every circumstance into account—the Labour Government has violated our fundamental principles, and we have betrayed ourselves by condoning the violation.

To my mind, however, this whole argumentation about *our* principles and *our* programmes and *our* policies, is fast becoming very old-fashioned. Everywhere the colonial peoples are themselves (or should be !) beginning to shape their own destinies. The time for working out in London detailed programmes for the Colonies is surely passing. Performance in the field still has to be watched vigilantly, though more and more that watchdog function should be handed over to the colonial peoples themselves, as their own political institutions develop. Criticism is still needed in the shaping of policy at the centre—though with Labour in office this should no longer be as exacting a job as formerly. And the old days, when what was needed most was sheer moral indignation against neglect and rampant abuse, are certainly dead and done. Instead of all this a new task opens before us—that of friendship and encouragement to the progressive and socialist forces emerging now within the Colonies, a sincere attempt to understand them and their problems and to help, if it still lies within our power. This is going to require a very different approach from the one which inspired us in 1940—but, if it can be carried through, it will be the *consummation* of the principles which we have always upheld.

● GOVERNMENT AND PARTY

by NAT WHINE

As a result of the emergence of a strong Labour Government in 1945 it has become apparent that the constitution of the Labour Party is inadequate to govern satisfactorily the relations between the Party and the Government. This issue was raised immediately after the 1946 annual conference in an article in *Tribune*, and again at the 1947 conference. It involves the function of the Annual Conference in relation to the programme and administration of a Labour Government.

The supreme governing authority of the Labour Party is the Annual Conference; and in between two annual conferences the National Executive Committee is responsible for the interpretation and application of conference decisions. At the 1946 and 1947 conferences it became apparent that much of the initiative in determining Party policy had passed from the Conference and the N E C to the Cabinet.

Both at Bournemouth and at Margate resolutions and debates were addressed almost exclusively to Government as distinct from Party policy. From the N E C platform in 1946 no attempt was made to distinguish between Party policy and Government programme; and more time was spent by Cabinet Ministers and members of the N E C in defending or explaining Government policy than by all other speakers together. A few deplored this in 1946; but more generally it was recognised that the first Annual Conference after the election of the first Labour Government with power was a fitting occasion to impress upon the world that the Government and all the Ministers had the full confidence of the Party.

At Margate more time was allowed to delegates. Only one Cabinet Minister who was not a member of the N E C took part in the debates; and, with the exception of the debate on economic affairs, the N E C refrained from addressing Conference twice on the same subject. It nevertheless remained impossible to distinguish between N E C and Government policy, and delegates were again asked to vote for or against resolutions, not because of their socialist content, or to renew oft repeated principles, but because the resolutions would be accepted as a declaration of confidence in the policy of the State Department or of the ruling Minister. No distinction was made, in voicing these demands, between those aspects of Government policy which arose directly out of approved Labour Party policy and those which were expedients to gain time.

● *The author of this article, Nat Whine, is a member of Marylebone Metropolitan Borough Council, and Chairman of St. Marylebone Borough Labour Party. He was a delegate to the Labour Party Conference at Margate in 1947.*

The implications of this development have been obscured by the fact that an appreciable proportion of the Cabinet Ministers have been contemporarily members of the N E C. What has in fact occurred? The Cabinet has considered it desirable and necessary that the measure of the general confidence reposed in it by the Labour Party shall be determined by the extent to which Conference is willing to endorse any and every aspect of Government policy. It has thereby created a situation in which it is becoming increasingly but reluctantly accepted within the Labour Party that every issue is an issue of confidence. The consequence of this procedure has been for the N E C and Conference to abdicate from their historic rôle and to surrender to the Cabinet the initiative in the determination of Party policy. This is a situation which has already aroused considerable comment and even anxiety in the Party, and which calls for an early remedy directed to re-asserting the supreme authority of Conference in determining Party policy.

In the opinion of Professor Laski, recorded in the article in *Tribune* already referred to, it will sometime be necessary to engage in radical alteration to the Labour Party constitution so as to render it more suitable to a Party which now produces Governments. In particular he wrote: "... a Cabinet cannot expect to be completely independant of a party to whose rank and file it owes its power ... and, at the same time, to dominate the organ through which the Party expresses its mind".

Such changes to the Constitution which are envisaged in this statement require lengthy consideration and consultations between all the organs of the Party, and lengthy discussions at Annual Conferences. It is doubtful whether such a process can be carried out in the near future.

In the meantime it would be appropriate to initiate changes in the relationship between the Labour Party and the Labour Government which will give effect to the spirit of the above views without involving the Party in the immediate consideration of constitutional amendments.

In considering changes which might be appropriate it is necessary to define clearly certain broader constitutional issues which are affected by this problem. We first have to reconcile three axioms:

A. The Annual Conference is the governing body of the Labour Party and the organ by which Party policy is decided, and through which it is formulated.

B. The Labour Government is the first Government which formally holds itself to be and is generally regarded as responsible for carrying out the policy of a national political party democratically organised, namely the Labour Party.

C. The Labour Government like previous British Governments is constitutionally responsible to the national electorate which include, but is wider than, the members and supporters of the Labour Party.

From this the attitude of the Labour Party should include recognition that

(i) the parliamentary responsibilities of an M P are wider than his responsibilities to his constituency party or to his national party.

(ii) a Labour M P must determine for himself the policies which he will support or initiate.

(iii) the responsibilities of a Labour Government are wider than the responsibilities of that Government to the Labour Party.

(iv) circumstances may arise in which a Labour Government may not find it possible to promote legislation or to take administrative action in accordance with declared Labour Party policy.

The application of the principles set out in (i) to (iv) above require that

(*a*) normally the introduction of legislation and the maintenance of an administration which do not conflict with the declared objects and principles of the Labour Party are necessary conditions for the continued confidence in their M P s and in the Labour Government by members of the Labour Party.

(*b*) Where, in the considered view of the Government, the situation demands a policy which diverges from the declared objects and principles of the Labour Party, such divergence shall clearly require the approval of a majority of the members of the Parliamentary Labour Party and subsequently the endorsement of a majority of delegates at the Annual Conference held next after the divergence has been presented to Parliament; but this shall not entitle members of the Government to ask for the repudiation of any of the declared principles or fundamental objectives of the Labour Party.

(*c*) the Government, through its representative speakers, shall not ask conference to forbear from a declaration of policy

(i) involving the re-shaping or the sharper definition of approved principles, or

(ii) calling for socialist legislation in a specific field of government on the grounds that such declarations are inconvenient or inexpedient, and are such as to cause embarrassment to the Government or any of the Ministers.

The acceptance of these conditions and of certain changes in conference procedure to be suggested below will permit the establishment of the following relationships:

It shall remain the function of

(i) Conference to define the principles, policy and programme of the Party.

(ii) the National Executive Committee to press for the implementation of Conference decisions by the Government.

(iii) a Labour Government to accept the moral responsibility of pursuing Labour Party policy as determined by Annual Conference.

A preliminary objective must be to distinguish at Conference between debates arising out of Government policy, and debates dealing with the principles and fundamental objectives of the Party.

The following procedure involves no constitutional change and can be adopted on the report of the Conference Arrangements Committee,

the more easily if the proposals are circulated for discussion by Labour Parties and affiliated organisations.

1. The order of Business at Conference shall be so arranged as to distinguish clearly between discussions on the Parliamentary Report, and on General Policy.
2. When the first notices for the Conference are sent out, D L P s and affiliated organisations shall be invited to state clearly whether they desire their resolutions to be discussed during the P R or the G P sessions.
3. The number of sessions to be allotted to P R and G P respectively shall be dependant on the response received to 2, above, but in no case shall more than two full days be allotted to P R discussions and debates.
4. (i) The Parliamentary Report shall be introduced by the Prime Minister or his deputy, and senior Cabinet Ministers shall be invited to reply to criticisms of the work and policy of departments for which they are responsible; Ministers shall not answer for the work and policy of departments for which they are not responsible.
   (ii) This phase of the Conference shall belong to the Government, and shall provide an opportunity for an exchange of views between the Government and the Party, and to determine whether and in what measure the Government retains the general support and confidence of the Party.
   (iii) In order to provide conditions suitable for liberty of speech by the delegates, free from contingent embarrassments to the Party, in respect of specific aspects of Government policy, the general discussion on the Parliamentary Report shall be held in open session, and a vote taken, and the discussions on the work of individual Ministers and their Departments shall be held in secret session.
5. (i) The General Policy sessions shall belong to the Party and shall provide an opportunity for the delegates to express freely their views on long term aims and current problems not covered by the Parliamentary Report.
   (ii) During these sessions Ministers shall address Conference only if they are members of the N E C or as provided in the next sub-paragraph.
   (iii) Ministers other than members of the N E C who wish to address Conference in the G P sessions shall have the same rights as other delegates or *ex-officio* delegates.
6. Except as provided in para. 5 (iii) above, the time to be allotted to members of the N E C or by Ministers addressing any session shall be strictly regulated by Conference through the medium of the daily report of the Standing Orders Committee.

If the above procedure is adopted the Party can then consider at leisure the further implications of the situation already outlined. In this connection it would be desirable for the N E C to set up a sub-committee to enquire into the constitutional changes necessitated by the arguments and the delimitations of function set out above, and to present an interim

report to the 1949 Conference. It will be the special duty of the sub-committee to suggest ways whereby a distinction can be drawn between general confidence in the Government, and approval or disapproval for specific acts of government.

It is also considered desirable that special consideration should be given to the constitution of the N E C. In general it will be accepted that the duties of Ministers provide them with a full-time administrative job which does not leave sufficient time to discharge effectively the onerous duties of contemporary membership of the N E C ; and that whereas the first duty of a Minister is to the nation and his office, the first duty of a member of the N E C is to the Labour Party. Notwithstanding that non-Government members of the N E C will always view sympathetically the problems and difficulties of the Government in the application of Labour Party policy, and that Ministers who may be members of the N E C will endeavour to implement the spirit of approved Labour Party policy, nevertheless a conflict of loyalties is bound to arise from time to time and it is not in the interests of the Labour Party that the views of Ministers should always prevail on the N E C.

Therefore it is undesirable that Ministers should be members of the N E C in numbers greater than are required to acquaint the other members of the N E C with the Government's views on any matter of joint interest and concern. It does not follow from this that there should be any formal limitation of the rights of Ministers as individual members of the Party, nor would it be in the interests of the Party to sacrifice the benefits of continuous consultation with tried and trusted leaders who retain at conference the confidence of their comrades.

Fortunately there is no monopoly of wisdom in members of the Party by virtue of their having been chosen as leaders, nor is it in the general interest that the monopoly of experience should be theirs.

In consequence it is considered desirable that

(1) Members of the N E C who enter the Government should be given leave of absence from N E C duties during their tenure of Government office; and

(2) during their absence their places on the N E C should be filled by the candidates receiving the next highest vote at the preceding Annual Conference.

(3) The N E C and the Cabinet should enter into flexible arrangements whereby the views of the Cabinet are adequately represented at N E C meetings.

(4) Members of the Labour Party shall not be debarred from seeking election to the N E C notwithstanding that at the time of the Annual Conference they may be members of the Government.

● A SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY

by K. ZILLIACUS, M P

(*In our last issue, we printed William Warbey's comments on the recent pamphlet 'Foreign Policy: the Labour Party's Dilemma', by Leonard Woolf, with a critical comment by W. N. Ewer, and his own interpretation of Foreign Policy. We now present yet another interpretation, by Mr. Zilliacus.*—ED.).

END OF THE PHONEY PEACE AND THE CHOICE BEFORE US

The breakdown of the London Four Power Conference marked the end of the phoney peace. We must now make up our minds whether we wish to settle down in earnest to prepare for a third world war through the familiar methods of building up a balance of power and engaging in an arms race, or whether we will make a real peace.

I am for making peace. The first step is to revise our fundamental conceptions of our position and purposes in the world, in the light of the threefold reality with which we are confronted, namely the American-Soviet conflict; the social revolution; the incursion of the common people into world affairs. These three aspects of the contemporary scene are distinct but inter-related.

AMERICAN-SOVIET CONFLICT

Secretary of State Marshall told a Chicago audience last November that the divergence between the United States and Soviet Russia was "not due to any direct clash between the national interests of these powers" but arose out of a "divergence of purpose concerning the future of Europe".

I prefer the description of the issue given by the veteran editor of the official organ of the Vatican, Count Giuseppe della Torre, in three remarkable articles in the *Osservatore Romano* of last June.

He pointed out that the conflict could not properly be described as a clash of opposing principles of civilisation or ideologies. It was rather a conflict of the policies of great powers, using ideologies to subserve their national purposes. He further made a historical parallel between the counter-revolutionary coalition led by Britain against revolutionary France a century and a half ago and the present situation, when, he said, there was a struggle between a counter-revolutionary coalition led by America against revolutionary Russia and Eastern Europe.

He concluded that in such a conflict rights and wrongs are mixed and distributed on both sides, and there is no issue that cannot and should not be settled by compromise and negotiation. He pointed out that

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● *The author of this article, K. Zilliacus, is M P for Gateshead and a member of the Advisory Committee of the Fabian International Bureau.*

communism had existed long before the Soviet Union and had originated in Western Europe, and that the forces of social revolution would continue to operate whatever happened to the U S S R in her clash with the U S A. He pounded home the lesson that it is impossible to fight ideas by force, said that with a third world war everything would be lost and not much remained to be lost after two world wars, whereas with peace everything could be regained, and concluded that " whatever may be the position or opinion one adopts with regard to communism, it is neither Christian nor civilised to hope to overcome or modify communism by the barbarity, the blood and horror, violence and anguish and wickedness of war ".

I agree with both that analysis and the conclusion. I also agree with the *Times*, of March 6, 1946, when, commenting on Winston Churchill's speech at Fulton, it condemned him for suggesting that Communism and Western democracy were " irreconcilable opposites dividing or attempting to divide, the world between them today ". That, said the *Times*, would be an assumption of despair and failed to recognise two important points:

" The first is that there are many forms of government intermediate between Western democracy and communism, and some of them may be better adapted at the present stage of development to the requirements of Eastern Europe or of the Middle or Far East. The second is that, while Western democracy and communism are in many respects opposed, they have much to learn from each other—communism in the working of political institutions and in the establishment of individual rights, western democracy in the development of economic and social planning.

" The ideological warfare between Western democracy and communism cannot result in an out-and-out victory for either side. The issue will be determined neither by clashes of eloquence nor by clashes of arms, but by the successs of the great nations in dealing with the problems of social organisation in the broadest sense which the war has left behind it ".

I start with that general view of the situation. I also agree with the Labour Party's emphatic statement in its pre-election report on *The International Post-war Settlement* that socialism is essential to the attainment of our international aims, and in particular in order to put an end to fascism and the causes of war, to make a success of economic reconstruction, and to promote the spread of democracy and political freedom in post-war Europe.

It follows that the Labour Government should regard the countries of socialist reconstruction as friends and partners at least as much as it does the capitalist United States. I believe further it is essential we should do so, not only for the sake of getting food and raw materials from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that will enable us to prevent the United States under the Marshall Plan dictating how we shall conduct our social and economic policy at home, but also in order to slacken the tension between the great powers and stop the drift to war, and to insulate ourselves partially against the next American slump.

THE COUNTRIES OF SOCIALIST RECONSTRUCTION

Today the countries of socialist reconstruction stretch from the middle of Europe to the Pacific Ocean and include one third (soon probably

two thirds) of China, an area about three times the size of the United States with a population of 300 millions. In addition almost the whole of the working class leadership, both trades union and political, of France and Italy, and a majority of the working class leadership of Germany, is, broadly speaking, on the side of the countries of socialist reconstruction. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania as well as Italy, Communist and Socialist Parties are in close alliance because that is the only way to secure working class unity and working class unity is the only basis on which socialist reconstruction can proceed and the danger of capitalist counter-revolution can be averted.

To bring countries that have never known democracy, have been deeply divided by class conflicts aggravated by fascist occupation, have suffered terrible damage and loss of life in the war, and have just passed through a social revolution, up to Western standards of parliamentary democracy is bound to be a slow and difficult task.

In order to decide in the light of experience what is the most hopeful line of advance, the real comparison is not between Eastern Europe and the old democracies of the West, but between the East European countries under Soviet influence and Greece. When that comparison is made the fact emerges with startling clearness that the countries of socialist reconstruction are on the high road to recovery by their own exertions, that their peoples are full of hope, faith and enthusiasm, that they have no doubt at all that their advanced, democratic constitutions, will in due course give them freedom as good as or better than that enjoyed by the Western powers when they have achieved economic prosperity and feel securely at peace. Whereas Greece is a shambles and an abomination although Britain and America and U N R R A have together poured 1,200 million dollars (nearly one-third of the American loan to Britain) into that little country.

THE COMMON PEOPLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Britain as a nation and the Labour Government as the rulers of Britain are in a strong position with the common people of both the United States and of our allies in the East. The mutual relations of the English-speaking peoples have long ago reached the stage in civilisation where the idea of the possibility of war has simply dropped out of the picture, and where however sharply the governments may be divided there will always be minorities in each country espousing the other government's cause and larger minorities who will consider it their duty to explain the other fellow's case patiently and fairly to their own countrymen.

As for Eastern Europe and the U S S R, they have a firm faith in the British workers. Even Soviet press utterances and Zhdanov in his Cominform report, however deplorably abusive against " Right-wing Social Democrats " have always been careful to make a clear distinction between them and the mass of the Labour Party and working class. To anyone who has been in these countries and talked to their leading statesmen, national planners, trades union and co-operative leaders, and to the man in the street (including the peasant on his farm and the worker in his factory) there really is no room for doubt that a friendly

and socialist policy by Labour Britain would meet with a response great enough to change the whole world situation.

THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY

What is our Government's policy in face of this three-fold reality? Frankly, I fear Mr. Churchill is right when he claims that they have lined up behind him and President Truman on the policy he first proclaimed at Fulton. It consists essentially in throwing overboard the Charter of the United Nations, which calls for settling all differences between the permanent Security Council members by peaceful means and never using force or the threat of force as a means of settlement. Anglo-American power politics take the place of the Charter, and as America supplies most of the power it means she determines the policy for which we are to use the threat of war as a final argument. In Greece and in Germany our conscripts are now mercenaries serving a policy decided upon in Washington and not in London.

US EXPANSION AND IMPERIALISM

But if geography is any guide, and I think it is relevant, the United States is today the aggressive, imperialist and expansionist power *par excellence*. Moreover, it is backing Fascism in China, a medieval, corrupt and cruel tyranny in Persia, Arab feudalism in the Middle East, a military dictatorship in Turkey and a Royalist, quisling régime in Greece, that differ little in either personnel, aims or methods from the régimes supported by the Nazi army of occupation.

Marshall Plan aid, it has been officially proclaimed by Acting Secretary of State Lovett, will be given to France and Italy only so long as the present Right Centre governments remain in office and will cease if ever there should be a reshuffling of parliamentary majorities or a change in a general election bringing governments of the Left into power. But it is impossible to reconstruct France or Italy, however many American dollars are pumped into those countries, without the willing co-operation of the trades unions and political parties of the working class. American aid is more likely therefore to precipitate civil war in France and Italy than to reconstruct Europe.

The ideological justification for this policy is anti-communism. In this, to judge by their utterances, Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin, not to mention Morgan Phillips and the editor of the *Daily Herald*, differ in no essential from Mr. Churchill. He is quite right in congratulating the Labour leadership on sharing his views on communism. They all stand well to the right of the *Times* and the official organ of the Vatican, for they make " the assumption of despair " and are willing to use force as their final argument against the social revolution. No wonder the Tories jubilantly acclaim continuity and national unity in foreign policy, and that the State Department has assured Congress that in foreign affairs there is no basic difference between the Conservative Party and the Labour Government.

THE MARSHALL PLAN WESTERN BLOC

The Woolf-Crossman school of thought as expounded in Mr. Woolf's pamphlet, in the *Keep Left* pamphlet, in Mr. Crossman's article in the

Political Quarterly of January–March, 1946, and in both their letters to the *New Statesman*, begin by sharing the Churchill-Truman-Bevin-Attlee hysteria about communism. Hence they both conclude that it is impossible to come to terms with the U S S R (although Woolf says we should nevertheless try), and they both write off the issue of socialism versus capitalism as having no relevance or significance in foreign affairs.

Having thus closed their minds to most of the realities that constitute the very stuff of world affairs today, they naturally have no solid alternative to propose to Anglo-American policy, which today includes organising Western Europe through the Marshall Plan. There is no such thing as a policy for making Western Europe independent of the U S A on the basis of anti-communism, and they cannot therefore propose any such policy. Instead, they in effect propose measures for carrying out American policy in Western Europe.

OUTLINE OF A SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY

The first step in a successful peace policy is for the Labour Government to declare that we stand by the Labour Party's view that socialism is essential to the reconstruction of Europe and to eliminating fascism and reviving democracy in Europe, and that we must be the friends and allies of the workers of Europe.

The Government should further declare that we will take the risk of basing our relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States on the fundamental principle of the United Nations Charter, which decrees that the permanent Security Council members have no obligation to fight each other in any circumstances and are, on the contrary, pledged to settle all their disputes by peaceful means. We would, therefore, put an end to the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the arrangements for standardising arms and pooling military intelligence, and we would co-operate on defence issues only in and through the Military Commission attached to the Security Council. The fighting services should be given a manpower and money ceiling on the basis of the political directive that we need not prepare our defences on the assumption that we might have to fight either the U S A or the U S S R. Commonwealth and imperial defence problems should be treated as matters requiring international policing arrangements through the Security Council and not as problems of how to prepare to fight any great power.

In the Far East and Middle East this policy could be worked out on lines similar to those proposed in Mr. Woolf's pamphlet, but with a real prospect of success in the new Anglo-Soviet context.

We should immediately take the remaining British troops and our military and police missions out of Greece and tell the Americans that unless they wind up their intervention we will bring the whole matter before the Security Council, with a proposal that a new policy be worked out based on the Anglo-American-Soviet agreement at Yalta to help the liberated Greek people restore democracy and stamp out the remains of fascism.

As regards Germany, we should take our stand on Labour's oft-expressed view that nationalisation of key industries, transport and finance and land reform is the essential economic foundation for making

a Germany that will be safe for peace and democracy. We have as much right to insist on the carrying through of those social reforms as the Americans have to insist upon a federal political structure for Germany. We should recognise that this policy could, in fact, only be carried out with trade union participation in the running of nationalised industries and the planning of economic life generally, and of unity of action between German working class parties on the political plane. This would mean that in return for the Russians allowing the Social Democratic Party to organise in the Soviet zone, we should adopt the official policy of encouraging (instead of as hitherto discouraging) unity of action between the Social Democrats, the Communists and the Socialist Unity Party throughout Germany, on terms not involving any intimidation or coercion. Germany's eastern frontier should be recognised, the Ruhr should be under four-power control, the powers should also share in the control of steel and coal production and transport throughout Germany. Germany, freed from her arms industry, could very well contribute a substantial amount of goods out of current production to the account of reparations, provided, as Molotov suggested at the London Conference, her industrial output was first doubled so as to raise it from 35 per cent to 70 per cent of pre-war level (this would be about the amount of industrial production devoted to civilian purposes before the war, for the Nazis in 1938 were using one-third of their industrial production for war preparations. Molotov proposed that 10 per cent of this 70 per cent of pre-war production should be used for reparations for a limited period of years).

As regards Europe in general the most urgent measure is to speed up and expand the policy of concluding trade treaties with the Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe. We should try to go beyond bi-lateral arrangements to some form of regional multi-lateral planning through the co-ordination of our national plans, matching and dove-tailing our production targets and export programmes on an ascending scale over a series of years, so as to get more and more food and raw materials from Eastern Europe in exchange for our manufactures, machinery, textiles, etc. Sweden, already bound by important trade treaties with both Poland and the U S S R, and Czechoslovakia, which is the only industrial member of the Eastern group, could together with this country play an important part in these arrangements. They would, of course, be complementary to arrangements made within the Commonwealth and Empire and would put us in a stronger position to get the maximum of benefit out of the Marshall Plan proposals while accepting the minimum of controls and undesirable economic directives and partly insulating ourselves against the shock of another American slump if and when it comes.

In this way Britain could become a living link between the states co-operating on the basis of the Marshall Plan and the Socialist planned economies of Eastern Europe and the U S S R. Our object should be as soon as possible to join up these two economic areas through the European Economic Commission of the United Nations.

On the political plane we should work for an all-European regional agreement resembling the United Nations in its general structure, based

on the triangle of Anglo-Soviet, Franco-Soviet, and Anglo-French alliances and related to the United Nations Charter. In this context it would be both possible and desirable to have a West European subdivision going most of the way to federation.

With a foreign policy thus based on Labour's election pledges and view of our national interest and purposes in world affairs, we should no longer appear as a mere echo of the United States in the United Nations and, therefore, could hope to secure Soviet as well as American agreement for the sensible proposals made by Mr. Bevin some time ago in the Security Council, for preliminary consultations between the permanent Security Council members, for resort to the procedure of conciliation and for the use of the system of '*rapporteurs*', in preparing a question for consideration by the Council and in mediating between the parties. Between them these proposals would go a long way to establish a code of behaviour for the use of the veto power. They would pave the way for a constructive compromise on control of atomic energy and weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of the U N Charter.

Again, in the new context of a British Socialist foreign policy, we could re-open the question of getting the Soviet Union into auxiliary organisations of the United Nations, particularly those concerned with finance, trade, food and labour, with a real prospect of success.

The strength of Britain's position in world affairs is that our interest and purposes have a good deal in common on the one hand with the U S S R and Eastern Europe and on the other with the U S A, the Dominions and Western Europe, and that even when we differ from both each is prepared to go a long way to come to terms with us rather than to leave us to agree with the other alone. The hold of the British workers and their Government on the affection and regard of the common people and the workers of Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States will be great enough, if and when our Government truly reflects the needs and ideals of our people in world affairs, to enable us not only to hold our own but to give a lead to all mankind.

● SUSAN LAWRENCE

by CLARA D. RACKHAM

The Fabian Society lost a very faithful supporter when Susan Lawrence died in October, 1947. She often said how much help she had received from the Society and she served it well, both as a member of the Executive Committee for 33 years and also as a welcome presence at Summer Schools. Only a few years before her death she delighted the students at an opening session with a racy account of her experiences during 30 years in the Labour movement.

Her career was in many ways a remarkable one. To one who knew her from when she came up to Newnham College in 1895 at the age of 24 until her death at 76 there seemed little in common between the strictly conventional and conservative student coming from a prosperous home in the West End of London and the eager Socialist that she afterwards became, one of the first three Labour women to enter Parliament, the beloved of Poplar and (for the sake of Poplar) a prisoner in Holloway gaol. As a student she could not fail to make an impression. She was tall, upright and dignified, with a disconcerting habit of looking at her interlocutor through a lorgnette which she carried to assist her extremely short sight. She had had something of a struggle with convention to get to College but anxieties were somewhat allayed by the possession of a piano in her room which she was never known to play (she was quite unmusical) and of a Dalmatian or carriage dog which followed her on bicycle rides as a protection. She worked hard for the Mathematical Tripos and played no games. Bicycling and boating were her outdoor pursuits; she was skilful in rowing and sculling. In politics she was a convinced, even passionate, Conservative; she led the Tory Party in the College Political Society and was eloquent in defence of Church and Empire. Her heroes at this time were Lord Byron and Lord Shaftesbury, and perhaps the latter choice was some indication of the burning desire to help the underdog which was such a feature of her later years.

At the end of three years at College Susan returned to live at her mother's home, her father, who was a well-known solicitor, having died in her third year. She at once became a School Manager and only two years were to pass before she was elected as a Moderate on to the London School Board. A few years later, when Education had passed into the hands of the London County Council, she won the safe Conservative seat of Marylebone. She made Education her chief interest, trying to secure for the Church Schools the same advantages as were enjoyed by those under the Board and, later, the Council. It was her acquaintance with the Schools which led to the great transformation in her outlook

on life. She was appalled at the low wages and wretched conditions of the women school cleaners; it was her efforts to improve these which brought her into close contact with Mary Macarthur, then secretary of the Women's Trade Union League and later of the National Federation of Women Workers. Susan found the Municipal Reformers on the L C C so indifferent to the grievances of charwomen that she took the brave step of resigning from the Party and from her seat on the Council. Courage was required as she was intensely interested in her Council work and her seat was perfectly safe as long as she toed the Party line. And, though she speedily joined the Labour Party, there appeared at the time no prospect of getting back to the Council as a Labour member. She threw herself into the task of organising factory girls and women, speaking at innumerable meetings at factory gates and elsewhere. It was not an easy job as the girls, until they got to know her and trust her, were amused at the " intellectual " voice and manner which she never entirely lost and at the monocle which had now replaced the lorgnette. The girls in imitation of this would equip their own eyes with pennies which fell to the ground with devastating clatter. But Susan was never daunted, and she made good use of the knowledge of industry that she obtained in her Trade Union work by becoming a most effective member of at least five Trade Boards.

It was during the early years of the first World War that she was elected as the first Labour woman on the L C C , and in 1919 on to the Poplar Borough Council. In 1921 she was one of the 28 Borough Councillors (including five women) who refused to collect the Poor Rate which, on account of the severe unemployment prevailing in Poplar, was a crushing burden on the Poplar people. For this refusal (which amounted in law to contempt of court) the 28 were sent to prison and Susan spent five weeks in Holloway. She bore this with an amused tolerance, jesting with the wardresses and trying to sing " The Red Flag " in unison with Labour supporters who gathered outside the prison to encourage and cheer those within.

The most brilliant success of Susan's public life was her career in Parliament. She stood unsuccessfully for Camberwell in 1920, fighting the election largely on the terribly high prices of food which then prevailed. In 1923 she was returned for East Ham North and soon proved her worth as a debater, particularly on industrial questions. But it was as an expert in finance in the debates in 1928 on Neville Chamberlain's De-Rating Bill that she won her Parliamentary triumphs. She figured frequently in *Punch's* " Essence of Parliament ", caricatured as Lady Susan Macbeth exclaiming " Infirm of purpose ! Give me the daggers ", and as the Red Queen saying to Alice (the House of Commons) " She can't do sums a bit ". According to Toby, M P " Nothing .... will ever convince the House that anybody except Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Miss Susan Lawrence really understands what the Government's proposals are ". She taunted the Minister with guessing at his figures, " When they would not add up right then some bright young man in the Ministry suggested multiplying them. Miss Lawrence gurgled triumphantly whenever she got one home on her adversary, at the same time reaching out at Mr. Chamberlain with gestures that seemed to suggest that she was

skinning him alive and on the whole rather enjoying it ". After this memorable service to the Party, no one was surprised when, in 1929, she was rewarded with office as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health. Here she devoted herself mainly to the Poor Law and the relief of the unemployed. She was indignant at the condition of the tramp wards in the Workhouses of that day and was able to bring about many improvements. She had many ups and downs in her public life, losing elections and winning them but she bore both triumph and disaster with cheerful courage. She was prominent in the councils of the Labour Party, serving for many years on its Executive Committee and as Chairman of the Party in 1930. She travelled widely, visiting Palestine, the West Indies, the U S A , Mexico and Russia.

Until the death of her mother Susan continued to live in her old home, but, after her election to the L C C as member for Poplar, she moved to a house just off the East India Dock Road. There she remained throughout the first World War, quite regardless of air raids. " Don't wake me unless its a direct hit ", she instructed her landlady. Later, after one period (with Mary Macarthur) in Golders Green and another in the Adelphi, she moved to the house in Millbank which had been the home of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Here she loved to entertain her guests, an amazing variety of whom would meet there at her evening parties. A task which gave her much pleasure in these years was the selection of quotations for the Labour diary, which was produced by the Party in 1940. The finding of 365 extracts from prose or poetry, many of them adapted to a particular anniversary, presented no difficulty to one so widely read in English literature and with such an enduring memory as Susan Lawrence. Some of her choices were extremely happy as for Mary Macarthur's birthday, " A star danced and under that star I was born ".

When during the second World War the house in Millbank was damaged by bombs, Susan moved to Berkshire where Lord Faringdon welcomed her in a house in Buscot Park. She realised that this would mean enforced leisure from public life so she set to work to learn to transcribe books for the blind into Braille and gave much time to this. In 1945 she moved back to London hoping to resume political activity, but it was not to be. Ill health intervened and she was an invalid for the last two years of her life, though retaining until the day before her death her keen interest in public affairs.

It is no easy task to sum up the impression that Susan Lawrence made on those who knew her and worked with her. She was not in one respect a good committee member as she was apt to be so much obsessed with what interested her at the moment that she did not readily give her mind to the views that others were expressing. As a speaker she varied: she could be both impressive and amusing, but she sometimes forgot the audience and its needs in her absorption in some theme of her own. But there was no mistaking the absolute honesty and the almost fanatical enthusiasm which won universal respect for the " good grey head which all men knew ". And with many it was not only respect but affection which was felt for her, particularly in Poplar. There she was " our Susan ", there the slogan " You can't shift Susan " adorned

the walls. After her imprisonment, Labour women unknown to her stopped her in the street and bestowed kisses upon her. Her conversation, like her speeches, sometimes suffered from the defects of her qualities but was often delightful. She had an incurable habit of losing her possessions, especially when travelling. Once when asked what wish she would choose to have granted, she suggested the return of all that she had lost and pictured the fountain pens, umbrellas and handbags rushing back to their owner. " But ", she added, " I should have to engage the Albert Hall ". On one occasion she met a noted anthropologist whose account of the habits of native peoples struck her as over-scientific so that she burst out, " How I should love to see them with their faces washed, going to Sunday school and trading with the empire ". And a Left Wing friend who asked her whether she had made the acquaintance of a certain agreeable Tory M P was met with the retort, " No. I don't preach the class war, I live it ".

But these quips and jests which are vivid to her friends are impossible to reproduce in cold print and it is best to give up the attempt. Susan Lawrence remains a great figure of her time, earnest, impulsive, with a cultivation of mind both wide and deep, with the highest standards in thought and conduct, devoted to the cause of Socialism and Labour.

● DIRECT LABOUR

The Practical Experience of a Building Works Manager

by "MUNICIPAL"

The instability of the building industry is so marked that it is often regarded as a reliable barometer of both national and local prosperity. It suffers from extremes of over-employment and unemployment, and even in boom periods building workers face many hazards peculiar to their mercurial trade. A lengthy stretch of inclement weather can make their life a constant struggle for existence. This is a vagabond industry, with men constantly moving from site to site, rarely remaining with one firm for any long period.

A growing belief in the need for stabilisation led between the wars to the establishment of Direct Labour schemes by certain municipalities as a cure for chronic unemployment. Lack of foresight, a piecemeal approach to the many problems, the stranglehold of antiquated Standing Orders, and other factors, led to many failures, which the opponents of Direct Labour were not slow to exploit. The fact that Direct Labour became a political issue caused undue emphasis to be placed on initial mistakes without regard being paid to the merits of the scheme.

Yet municipal enterprise in the form of Direct Labour properly organised can provide an unequalled public housing medium, with stability and security for the worker so much lacking hitherto, at the same time reducing building costs. It can utilise to the full the important contribution that workers can make to an industry with proper machinery of consultation, in harmony with the principles of our post-war social revolution.

What are the crucial points that must be borne in mind in establishing a Direct Labour scheme? I would stress particularly two—mutual confidence between elected representatives and responsible officials, permitting flexibility of action in control of labour and purchase of materials without the stranglehold of red tape; and secondly the constructive co-operation of the men employed.

RELATION TO THE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT

Many municipalities have established Maintenance Departments to keep their properties in repair. As Corporation investments have

● *"Municipal," the cuthor of this article, has had wide experience in the building industry. He has lectured in building subjects, been a building surveyor and a contracts manager, and is now Works Manager to a large local authority.*

increased their departments have grown numerically with consequent reduction in efficiency. Within this antiquated framework direct labour building has been commenced.

Whilst it is impracticable to divorce the two building sections from one another an endeavour to use one as the springboard for the other is a serious mistake.

A Direct Labour section for new building must be commenced at a level consistent with its intended ultimate capacity. This does not mean that it must undertake the whole of the municipal programme of work. Neither must it be overloaded with administrative overheads and oncosts.

PLANNING

Recruitment of staff must be centred round a Building Manager, and the planning of the department left to the staff who will be responsible for its success.

On the basis of a carefully prepared and detailed report Council approval must be given and agreement to considerable expenditure obtained for the purchase of plant and equipment, and the establishment of a costing system.

The report should deal with the re-organisation of the maintenance section also. If the maintenance section is efficiently organised some adjustment will still be necessary. Interchange of labour between the two sections adds variety to the work of the operatives. The already established reservoir of Maintenance labour can provide an initial operational nucleus for Direct Labour building, and can both supply and absorb labour as site works fluctuate. During sustained periods of inclement weather when site works are impossible the labour can be rapidly transferred to indoor maintenance work, ensuring full and continued employment, and thus reducing to negligible proportions the effect of this non-productive charge, while catching up with maintenance arrears which have so accumulated during the war years. Approximately 4 per cent of a Building trade operative's time is normally lost through inclement weather.

WORKERS' CO-OPERATION

At this stage, the confidence of the workers must be secured. There is no doubt that the Building Trade operatives of today have the same productive capacity as in pre-war days and if they are considered to be malingering the cause is to be found in the exploitation of the cost-plus system operated during the war, together with the reaction of over-employment after years of unemployment. Unfortunately this has contributed to some degree in reducing craft skills, and in consequence rehabilitation is sometimes required.

The value of the artisan, the productive unit, has never been more pronounced than it is today. Full recognition can be paid to this in Direct Labour schemes where security of employment and individual welfare is recognised as helping economic production.

Workmen who have been exploited throughout their working lives and permitted only a very limited say in general management, may well

flounder when suddenly given a substantial say in the order of things unless given decisive leadership and educated up to a true recognition of their joint responsibility. Bureaucratic control and the domination of the agitator must be alike avoided.

JOINT WORK'S COMMITTEE

The establishment of a Joint Work's Committee, including a true cross-section of all labour employed, with equal numerical representation from the management, will not only lay the foundation of mutual trust and respect but will open up a medium for constructive criticism and the ventilation of grievances. Properly directed it will become an invaluable source for the discussion and interchange of ideas on production. This will undoubtedly result in co-operation, increased production, improvement in general welfare and the closing up of the gap that hitherto has existed between management and worker.

The Committee must be properly elected and run along constitutional lines. It is an essential qualification that any of its recommendations which are accepted must be fully implemented, otherwise faith and goodwill will soon dissolve. Often workers find difficulty in expressing what they want to say and require prompting in the framing of any resolution. A little humour, a little tolerance, and full consideration of the simplest recommendations will provide substantial results.

TRAINING

In these days of shortage of materials, the necessity of using substitutes, and the many new methods being introduced into the building industry, regard must be paid to the education of the tradesmen. Ignorance amongst the workmen in non-traditional practices will inevitably result in slow progress and frustration. For example, lead is not only prohibitive in price but is rapidly becoming increasingly difficult to purchase. Copper is an excellent substitute, but very few plumbers are practised in welding copper. The local Technical College can be called in to provide a course on copper welding and lead burning. One Municipal Direct Labour Department has promoted a course, for plumbers excluding apprentices, who have daytime facilities for such further education, and thus removing any form of embarrassment to the men. The response to this course was a striking example of the workman's desire to improve his craft and real keenness to learn new methods. Other fields of activity for other trades and refresher courses must be progressively instituted not only to bring craft back into the industry but also to give encouragement to the men.

MATERIAL SUPPLY

Calculated economies can be effected through the bulk purchase of materials, with considerable reductions in high percentage discounts. It will probably be necessary to have the Standing Orders of the municipality on controlled expenditure amended to allow unfettered action by the official in taking advantage of materials available, making use of maximum discounts, and generally exploiting the materials market to the advantage of the organisation. One case is on record where £3,000

was saved in one purchase alone by this method. Such spending must, of course, be carefully scrutinized and approved in retrospect.

The additional productivity of labour obtained through having abundant material supplies is difficult to assess. The following figures register comparative productivity brought about within 12 months of the reorganisation of a Direct Labour Maintenance Department. In November, 1946, with 230 men working on maintenance work, 2,464 stores issues were made; during September, 1947, with the strength at 290 men, over 8,000 stores issues were made—an increase from 11 to 27 issues per man, which gives a 140 per cent increase in productivity without any increase in labour costs.

LABOUR CONDITIONS

Despite the many additional benefits that a Municipal Building Trade operative enjoys—3 weeks holiday with pay compared with the 6 days allowed through the Holidays With Pay scheme, no loss of pay through inclement weather as distinct from the 32-hour week normally paid, additional substantial sick benefits, superannuation, long service bonus, etc , together with the cost of a full administrative staff, the oncost percentage on any work is in one scheme as low as 22 per cent labour and 12 per cent stores, which compares very favourably with a Building Contractor's costs on similar work, whose non-productive costs must be far lower. One municipality purchased reseating tools for taps and ball valves. Many of these articles in very short supply were recovered by this means and reissued through stores for a further 5 years' service. The reaction was most unexpected. The request on stores for taps fell by 300 per cent; on investigation it was found that workmen, instead of stripping out the old as hitherto and scrapping, were reseating the taps on the job, saving labour as well as materials, methods peculiar to Direct Labour and hardly expected to be found in a profit-seeking economy.

The scope of Direct Labour makes it possible to establish permanent canteens with catering licences, usually only operative on large building contracts and then only for the period of the contract. The staffing of each with a manageress is not only of great service to the men but an economical factor when comparison is drawn between the cost of a manageress and the time wasted by workmen in brewing tea or queueing for food for midday meals. Run on a non-profit basis with the canteen costs loaded onto the oncost rate, good subsidiary meals sufficient for a full dinner, together with a hot beverage, can be supplied to a workman today for 9d. Alternatively, sandwiches, soup, etc., can be purchased at reasonable rates to supplement a workman's meal, thus bringing the canteen within the scope of the poorest paid. Profits can be returned to the men in the form of free teas during the mid-morning break. The canteen throws little additional work on the staff, once the position is established, as a good manageress will manage the bulk of the work herself.

COSTING

A Direct Labour organization is a non-profit-making undertaking, and in consequence is unable to transfer profit or loss from one contract to another and thus produce an overall favourable balance sheet. This

calls for a high standard of administration and demands a very searching costing system with full and progressive financial control throughout any contract. At any time it must permit impartial scrutiny by an independent audit. The impression prevalent amongst the public is that any losses sustained in a municipal undertaking are just 'salted' away, whereas on the contrary any over-expenditure is critically surveyed, not only by the financial experts of the Corporation but by a further detailed investigation by the Ministry of Health, with whom all loan sanctions for capital expenditure are made.

In setting up a costing system, the financial experts desire to provide an overwhelming amount of statistical information and theoretical costing must be resisted. Its first aim must be information on the progressive costs of defined operations and to permit remedial action to be taken at intermediate stages if necessary. Provided a happy and co-operative working liaison can be established between the municipal departments involved, a costing system far beyond the reach of a building contractor can be adopted. Centralized costing as known to the larger municipalities makes Mechanised Accountancy an economic proposition. Accurate and progressive accumulative costs can be provided at regular intervals of not less than 10 days, with a detailed analysis of the build-up of the costs of each operation, and a sub-analysis into trades of the workmen employed, at the same time affording excellent and reliable information for Unit Costing. Such information if properly applied can effect considerable savings by observing the margin of utility in the numerical strength of workmen employed on any particular operation. The Building Industry with its many small firms, with no recognised basis for the establishment of good costing, has applied its ingenuity to rule of thumb methods with very little reliable statistical information on comparative detailed costs. But the application of mechanised accountancy to building costs has already proved its worth in the solid reduction of manhours engaged on similar operations in subsequent blocks of houses.

Competent ordering, and good phasing of deliveries of materials, will go a long way to ensuring good progress. Proper siting of materials to reduce handling charges will help to keep down operational costs reducing to a minimum the more laborious tasks of the men.

ON THE SITE

Site or operational establishment is a major factor. In ensuring the success of any contract, a municipal authority must be selective in its staffing, owing to the distinct contrast in its fundamental idealisms from that of private enterprise. The traditional type of general foreman may well prove totally unsuited to a similar task on Direct Labour Schemes. Though of good reputation and sound experience, his inability to recognise the distribution of responsibility within the new order in the respective spheres of all employed is probably pronounced in his failure to organise the men, bereft of the old method of coercion of hunger and insecurity, his traditionally effective weapons of control. A municipal authority must be ruthless in dealing with this problem, gathering from the personnel available and from the ranks suitable men for educating in the principles

of the new order, gathering together a band of enthusiastic men for key positions, who are ripe for accepting the changed conditions, and entering into the spirit of responsible partnership in the enterprise with a direct interest in its success.

Good site conditions will attract good tradesmen. Good site organisation will establish an orderly acceptance of the standards required. Energetic and skilful handling of the many problems which today attend building operations will infuse the men with a similar spirit. In fact, destroy the defeatist spirit in the administration and it will never reflect itself within the ranks. Over-employment, created through manpower shortage, has revealed to the artisan his real value, and the equal dependence of staff and workers in the success of any undertaking. All must be made to realise that this new-found security, equal partnership and considerably enhanced conditions, must be earned, and that in consequence the maximum endeavours and self-discipline must be forthcoming.

Site Sub-Committees, working under the Joint Work's Committee and with representation on it, can give excellent and constructive help in affording day by day remedial action on operations. Like any Committees with substantial representation from the ranks, such Sub-Committees require careful guidance and their authority must be limited to the Committee room, though their findings and recommendations must be disseminated to every member of the site.

The value of Direct Building, as a yardstick for use by the public in the measurement of values of building works done against costs charged, must not be forgotten. Standards, both of materials and of workmanship, can be linked with reasonable costs, thus establishing a good basis for forming the comparative costs of similar work.

The justification of Direct Labour, with its security of employment and good conditions, lies finally in the achievement of results. Let me conclude with the experience of one County Borough which commenced Direct Labour building operations with 50 houses in April, 1947. Four houses were completed and occupied within 25 weeks, with costs substantially lower than the contract price, based on the price for similar houses agreed with private enterprise. The remaining 46 houses and probably more will be completed within 12 months of the commencement with costs progressively reduced. The figure of 3,400 manhours[1] on the first house is now rapidly approaching the level of 3,000 manhours per house, a high standard of workmanship being maintained. All this has been achieved by the principles laid down above, whilst private enterprise is endeavouring rather abortively to link production with incentive payment. The industry requires first of all consolidation of conditions and security of employment rather than inflationary productive incentives. Municipal Enterprise is the only factor that can successfully link these conditions with production; at the same time promoting that pride of every Englishman—a belief in himself and his craft.

1 This figure includes trainees and apprentices, together with manpower spent on manufactured joinery, electrical and. gas installations. For actual site hours this number can be reduced by approximately 400 Manhours

● BOOK REVIEWS

THE BRITISH IN ASIA By Guy Wint (Faber and Faber 12/6)

Now that India and Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon have taken their place as independent nations, this book is particularly timely, for it attempts to analyse the impact of Britain on Asia, and the problems that emerge with the withdrawal of British rule.

Mr. Wint's thesis is that the British Empire in Asia was in reality an *Indo*-British Empire—based on Indian, rather than British, strategic needs, built by the (British) Government of India rather than by the home government which, " except when goaded by individual experts, was chronically cautious ". " Though in the Indian Government a ' Little India ' school always existed, there was also an ' Indian Empire ' school; first one prevailed, then another: and in moments of the ascendancy of the latter the Empire spread ". Of that Empire, only Malaya remains under direct British control. What will take its place?

The answer depends to some extent on the mood in which the ex-subject nations in South-East Asia set about their task. The bitterness and frustration engendered by their long drawn-out struggles, the disruption of their ancient societies by the incursion of the heavy-handed West, the distrust between different sections of the populations which worked in uneasy alliance for the newly-won freedom—all these hang like a millstone round the necks of Burma and the three new Dominions. But the new energies which made the achievement of independence possible remain to be canalised into new channels; nor have traditional incentives been totally obliterated—as Mr. Wint says: " the ancient India is even today very much alive . . . . Temples and mosques are still being built: contrast this with China, where nobody builds new temples, though Christian converts build churches ".

The last section of the book deals with the other great powers which have influenced Asia: Tsarist and Bolshevik Russia, China and America, and Japan which may emerge later. On the assumption that hostile competition amongst the sovereign powers will continue, Britain's rôle is envisaged as that of co-operation with the countries of the former Empire within a general system of security and in building up economic stability in this poverty-stricken area.

But such a rôle presupposes a new effort on Britain's part. Mr. Wint's early chapters do not give a very encouraging picture of Britain's previous efforts in South-East Asia, and his conclusion is justifiably pessimistic. " The British public ", he says, " has a limitless capacity for becoming bored by the Orient ," and is, if anything, becoming more rather than less bored. It is the great merit of this book that it cannot possibly bore even the most unimaginative amongst us. Here are the lightness of touch and the emotional sympathy which might have spared much suffering in Asia if they had been characteristic of British administration. Even though the book lacks the solid fact which the subject really requires, all this can be found elsewhere. Even with its faults, Mr. Wint's book provides the stimulant which the British public needs if it is to set its hand to the task of holding " by its own civilisation the imagination and sympathy of the East ", and if, even at this late hour, it is to enrich that civilisation by working in co-operation with peoples whom it has hitherto dominated.

MARJORIE NICHOLSON.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SOVIET RUSSIA, 1929—1941 : Vol. 1, by Max Beloff. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Oxford University Press 15/- net)

The Royal Institute of International Affairs, in producing a study of *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, is filling a strange gap in our political literature. The importance of the subject needs no emphasis. Yet, since Mr. Louis Fischer's

The Soviets in World Affairs, there has not been, at any rate in English, any coherent and comprehensive account of it. Mr. Fischer took the story to 1929. And it is there that Dr. Max Beloff begins. The years 1917 to 1929 are left as a later task.

This first volume covers seven years from 1929 to 1936. It is the period of comparative quiescence between the stormy times which followed the Revolution and the storms which preluded the second war. There were crises—Manchuria and Ethiopia. But they did not immediately and acutely affect the Soviet Union.

And the purpose of the Soviet Government's policy throughout the period was essentially one of ensuring its own peace, so that it could devote all its energy to internal economic development—and to internal political troubles.

It seemed to have renounced all revolutionary, as well as all territorial ambitions. Its one desire was to be at peace with all countries, whatever their forms of government. " Fascism " Stalin said, " is not the point ". And, again, " the foreign policy of the U S S R is oriented to the U S S R, and nowhere else ".

To that end the Soviet Union wanted to build up a system of non-aggression pacts with all its neighbours, to make, so, a belt of safety around its own borders. To that end it kept carefully aloof while the League of Nations and the United States became involved in the Sino-Japanese tangle. And to that same end, two years later, the Soviet Union joined the League, which it had once denounced as a " thieves kitchen ".

The sharp test was the coming to power of Hitler. The maintenance of friendship with Germany had been, since the Treaty of Rapallo, in 1922, a cardinal feature of Soviet policy. Could that friendship be kept with the Nazis? It is significant that the Soviet Government tried to keep it—even after the Reichstag fire and the ruthless persecution of the German Communists. " We of course sympathise with the sufferings of our German comrades " said Litvinov, " But we Marxists are the last who can be reproached with allowing our feelings to dictate our policy . . . We desire to have with Germany the best of relations. Nothing but good can come from such relations ".

It was Hitler who made Soviet German relations impossible, and forced the Soviet leaders, while still (even in 1935) insisting on their desire for good relations with him, to seek reinsurance in the League and the Franco-Soviet pact.

So it came about that the Soviet Union, which at the opening of the volume was—save for the ' Rapallo ' link—politically isolated, is, at its close, an active and important member of the League, working in association with its former chief enemies, France and Britain. The change of policy was the outcome of a continuity of purpose—the result of Russia's imperative need for peace.

It goes without saying that Dr. Beloff's work is scholarly and scrupulously documented. And, dealing with a theme on which judgment is so liable to be swayed by almost inescapable political or social prejudices, he has achieved a remarkable objectivity. Here lies the greatest merit of the book.

Its greatest fault, I think, is its design. Dr. Beloff has adopted a geographical division—" Russia and the Nazi Reich ", " Russia and Great Britain ", and so on. The arrangement confuses and conceals the essential pattern: so that sometimes the crowding trees hide the wood.

But it remains a truly valuable book—indispensable to all students of international affairs. The gap has been well filled.

W. N. Ewer.

LABOUR MARCHES ON By John Parker (Penguin Books 1/6)

THE CASE FOR CONSERVATISM By Quintin Hogg (Penguin Books 2/-)

These two pieces of propaganda would be worthy of notice if only because of the circulation which, as Penguins, they will achieve. Taken separately, each has quite different assets from the other, and taken together they present a contrast which results from more than the obvious facts that Quintin Hogg required 100 pages more than John Parker to state his case, that the authors represent different parties and that they are men of unlike personalities.

Labour Marches On, sober and factual, could never be quoted as an instance of doctrinaire, theoretical Socialism. Even the one chapter on foreign policy is a

description of situations rather than an assessment of policies. I imagine John Parker decided that the best use he could make of a Penguin was to present as much clear information as possible about the Labour Party and its actual policies, which is a sensible approach. The chapters on the Labour Party machine and on the relations between the Labour Government and the Labour Party and the T U C are particularly useful on a much neglected subject. In a work of this kind the small space which the author allows for his own divergencies from particular official Labour policies is commendable.

The chief weakness of the book, even as a factual survey, is its neglect of the crucial foreign trade problem, whereas it is a prime virtue of, say, Professor Cole or (in spite of the woolliness of their solutions) of the 'New Statesman' school of writers that their analysis of Britain's economic position centres on this problem. John Parker, one would say, is interested in the political scene rather than the economic background, but further discussion of economic factors would probably have led to interesting speculations on the economic conditions under which Social Democracy can be achieved and can survive. But I realise that John Parker must have written with an eye all the time on his ration of 200 pages, within whose limits he has gone a long way towards bringing *Practical Socialism for Britain* up to date.

That *The Case for Conservatism* is racily, often savagely, written is due, of course, to the authorship of Quintin Hogg. That a large part of it is given up to political and social theorising may be attributed partly to the same cause, and partly to the location of the Conservative Party in the Opposition benches. "Those who can, do: those who can't, theorise" would not be entirely untrue of political parties. There was no Industrial Charter when Baldwin was in power with his avowed contempt for theory. Not that, where Conservatives are still in power, in the factories and businesses which they own, they make much attempt to implement the Industrial Charter. That is why, though Quintin Hogg makes out at least a tenable case for Conservatism, he establishes no case for the Conservative Party or Conservative policies as we see them.

Though it is not enough for Socialists to harp on the past misdeeds of Conservative Governments, the Conservative Party *has* got a past which will take a lot of living down. "Conservatives . . . . " says Quintin Hogg, "do not approve of Stalinism in Russia. Nevertheless, they are slow to condemn such régimes until the evidence condemning them is overwhelming, and even then will always hesitate to intervene to overthrow them unless and until their continuance is shown to be an intolerable menace to international security" (p. 28). But for what evidence about the new Soviet Government of 1917 did Churchill wait before throwing himself into the cause of anti-Soviet intervention? So much of the present Soviet intransigeance has its origin in past Conservative foreign policies which have no relation to Quintin Hogg's theoretical Conservatism. Again, on the subject of property, Quintin Hogg is no doubt sincere when he writes: "More Conservatives than myself do not approve of a situation in which a great portion of the ground rents of Cardiff are owned by a limited company in London, and do not believe that a little line of working-class houses is a suitable investment for the life savings of a capitalist" (p. 102). But when has the Conservative Party or a Conservative Government proposed to end that situation?

In brief, though many of Quintin Hogg's ends may be defensible, he does not pursue the implications of Kant's dictum to the effect that he who wills the end must will the means, a dictum which Hogg himself nevertheless quotes without acknowledging its authorship. For he adheres to a party which does not will the means to the ends which he professes, and no doubt he is unhappily aware of this. Until such time as Conservative policies correspond more closely with Hogg's theories of Conservatism, we may leave the finer points of, say, his treatment of the Organic Theory of Society or the Religious Basis of Society.

The essential difference between the two books is that Quintin Hogg's is about his own ideas of Conservatism as it ought to be, while John Parker's is about the Labour Party as it is and to which genuine Socialists can reasonably, if not always entirely happily, belong.

"QUINTUS"

LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT by G. D. H. Cole (Cassel 15/-)

Professor Cole's new book is as lucid and persuasive as ever. He takes the nation's complex system of local government and finds it wanting; and he then boldly sets about reforming it into new units which shall be both more efficient and more democratic. His contention is, and it is a fair one, that we need both larger and smaller units of local administration. The larger ones are needed because many services cannot be dealt with efficiently by the present counties and county boroughs, which are the largest local authorities we have and which bear the stamp of their 19th century origin, when the motor car had not been invented, industry and population had not dispersed all over the countryside, and town and country were regarded as things to be kept apart in watertight compartments. Especially are larger authorities needed to do the new job of town and country planning, still in practice at an embryonic stage, together with the public utilities and other services which ought really to be associated with it. Administrative efficiency therefore requires larger units; but active democracy requires that there shall also be smaller ones, namely, neighbourhood or parish councils which should be not just notional forms, but minute local authorities of an active disposition, handling the practical application of many welfare and housing problems which could be delegated to them by the larger authorities.

Most of Professor Cole's ideas are good in themselves. Most of the new local authorities he suggests are, considered severally, desirable. But the trouble is that in this enthusiasm the author suggests so many different sorts of local authority as to risk perplexing the elector and causing a dangerous division and dispersal of administrative responsibility. Let me try to enumerate the authorities which Professor Cole would create.

At the top would be a regional authority comprising several counties; next would come the county itself which would absorb existing county boroughs; then within the county there would be a number of new units called town and country incorporations, some of them large and urban such as Leeds or Sheffield and its environs, others consisting of a small market town with the countryside around it; and finally, at the bottom of the scale, the parish and neighbourhood councils which would exist in both town and countryside. This amounts to a four-tier system, which is at least one and probably two tiers too many. Each tier may have a very good reason to be there, but this does not alter the fact that the whole is top-heavy; and the result might be to defeat Professor Cole's own aims. For our local government system will be neither efficient nor democratic unless it is reasonably simple.

Nevertheless, the book remains a highly valuable contribution. Professor Cole has made a dry subject eminently readable, and even fascinating, to the layman. One reason for this is that he has had the courage to illustrate his ideas by taking particular areas and reorganising them in very considerable detail. He does this for Devon, Norfolk, the West Riding and Greater London and many other districts as well; he suggests alternative ways of grouping counties into regions and he defines and maps the larger conurbations, each of which he thinks should be given a separate and single regional council of its own. Indeed, his ideas for the government of our large urban blocks such as Tyneside and Merseyside and the London region, are simpler and better than his plan for the rest of the country. Moreover, he puts across very well two ideas of the greatest value and importance. One is that it is high time for town and country to be reintegrated administratively—an aim which points to the amalgamation of many small municipal boroughs with their surrounding rural districts and many medium county boroughs with their surrounding counties; and he provides ample illustration of the necessity for some sort of regional council, at any rate in the conurbations. If Professor Cole's particular plan of reorganisation is not the right one, if in his enthusiasm he overloads the machine, at least it may be said that his book should turn the public's thoughts in the right direction.

PETER SELF.

● SHORTER NOTICES

JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, A STUDY OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION By William A. Robson (Stevens 25/–)

A very valuable book, whose subject is fairly indicated by its title. With exhaustive research, Robson has given an account of the very numerous and varied administrative tribunals of this country, and discusses their functions and probable development, and makes suggestions for their improvement. Unlike the writings of many legal theorists, the book is eminently readable. It is recommended to all politicians, civil servants and lawyers of educated intelligence.

On a point of detail, when Benchers of an Inn of Court deal with a disciplinary matter, judges do not attend. The barrister or student concerned may appeal from the Benchers to the judges. The appeal is heard by about six judges from various Inns. I may add that the idea of tribunals being liable for actions for negligence appeals to me.

G.R.B.W.

THE FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR By Julian Blackburn (International Library of Sociology and Reconstruction) Kegan Paul (12/6)

Dr. Blackburn deals with the factors of inheritance and of environment. The physical and mental make-up of individuals is placed in its social context, and the part played by sex and racial differences is indicated.

The importance of this book to the politically-minded lies in its conclusion that nationality and social class are environmental factors which it is possible to control. The dangers to society of social privilege, and national sovereignty, could be substantially reduced if the political implications of this evidence were widely recognised and acted upon.

K. O. B.

THE RENAISSANCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL By Kurt Lachmann (Charles Skilton Ltd 7/6)

This is an earnest book in a Good Cause. Dr. Lachmann wants a world Supreme Senate of Judges, and a High Court of Universal Law, to protect the individual from the destructive pressures of State-reason and State Laws. The juristic approach is the best part of a book, which grows duller as it covers ground already well-trodden. There are so many books about Man, and the Individual, that it becomes a question whether he is not in greater danger of death by abstraction than of submersion in the mass.

K. H.

WHO SHALL BE EDUCATED? THE CHALLENGE OF UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITY Edited by Karl Mannheim (Kegan Paul 10/6)

The book gives a graphic description of the American system of public education together with the results of a searching enquiry into how far it offers to all children a genuine equality of opportunity. "The curricula of the secondary schools", the writers state, "provide early pathways to success and failure, they operate in a different way on the several class levels, and they are used in a different way by the children of the higher and lower levels. It is apparent that the high school curriculum is a mechanism which helps perpetuate our class order". Some interesting figures are given showing the relation of intelligence to educational opportunity at different levels of socio-economic status. Thus a study of students (Pennsylvania) with intelligence quotients 110 or over showed that while 36.3 per cent of students above the average status level and 59 per cent of students below the average graduated from high school, of these 56.8 per cent of students above the average status level attended college, but not more than 12.9 per cent of students below the average were able to do so. Among the recommendations is one for

a wider recruitment of teachers from both upper-class and working-class homes, who are said to be less sensitive to ' class ' than the middle-class teacher and less obsessed by the ideals of material success and social betterment. The negro forms a problem of his own, and the chapter on his place in the American ' caste ' system gives an ugly picture of racial prejudice and oppression.

B. D.

SOME ASPECTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (U S State Department pp. 59 20 cents)

TOWARDS TOTAL PEACE : A LIBERAL FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES (Americans for Democratic Action pp 43 35 cents)

The first of these American pamphlets is a dull simplified official statement of policy, designed to explain America's stand in foreign affairs to the American public. Written by the State Department, it is inevitably guarded and uncritical—an apologia and not an analysis. But it has its value to British as well as American readers.

Towards Total Peace is a critical analysis and a positive statement of policy by *Americans for Democratic Action*, a group of Americans including several original New Dealers. They advocate containment of Russia, and all support for Social Democrats in Europe, who " stand more than any group of men in Europe for the traditional American ideals of democracy ". It provides an interesting companion piece to the Fabian pamphlet *Foreign Policy : the Labour Party's Dilemma.*

A. W.

[*Continued on page* 36

HIRE PURCHASE LAW By Maurice Share, B A (4/–)

INCOME TAX By C. N. Beattie, LL B. (4/–)

NATIONAL INSURANCE By John Gazdar, LL B. (3/–)

(Stevens, " This is the Law " series)

Three further contributions to enhance this welcome series of booklets. They make clear many basic principles of the law dealt with.

R. S. W. P.

THE GOLD STANDARD IN THEORY AND PRACTICE By R. G. Hawtrey (Longmans, 1947 9/6)

The fifth edition of a well-known work originally published in 1927. Mr. Hawtrey explains the functions and operations of a Gold Standard against the background of historical experience. There is a valuable new section on the Bretton Woods Plan in which the author makes a case for stabilisation of the wealth-value of the monetary unit lest an unprecedented expansion should result in the corollary of contraction and deflation.

If only as an introduction to monetary history, this book is worth reading.

L. H. B.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIA By A. G. L. Shaw (Longmans, Green & Co. 7/6)

This short and handy account of the growth of the Commonwealth of Australia, from the economic point of view is of necessity much condensed, but within this limit it covers the ground effectively. It is to be welcomed as a useful outline for the general reader and a good introduction for the student.

V. L. V.

THE CANDIDATE'S COMPANION (Notes for examinees in elementary economics) By H. M. Croome (Christopher's 5/–)

The need for such a book as this has long been felt by students of economics, and it is to be warmly praised both for the job it does and for the skill with which it does it. The analysis of answers to questions in economics not only helps the examinee by showing the ways in which his knowledge can be arranged, but also quickens the awareness of the ramifications of his subject and of the pitfalls to be avoided. The chapters of " reply analysis " are preceded by chapters of very useful advice about the methods of study. Had this book been available when the present reviewer was studying for his B Sc (Econ.), he would have bought it immediately.

M. V.

THE REAL LLOYD GEORGE By A. J. Sylvester (Cassell 18/–)

This book by the famous politician's private secretary is a revelation of a vain and bad-tempered man with a touch of genius. The sections on the Irish Peace Treaty and the Genoa Conference are dramatic, and show how statesman of all lands double-cross one another. L.G.'s comment on Churchill, made in July, 1940, is pertinent: " I don't think Winston is a democrat; his real interest is in the governing classes. He does not want a strong proletariat party ".

A. E. D.

CORRECTION

In our last number the price of *Trade Union Structure and Closer Unity* (T U C) was wrongly stated as 10/–. The correct price is 9d.